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SeiN uNd GeiST: Heidegger’s Confrontation 
witH Hegel’s PHeNomeNoloGy
robert sinnerbrink
AbstrAct: this paper pursues the ‘thinking dialogue’ between Hegel and Heidegger, a dialogue 
centred on Heidegger’s ‘confrontation’ with Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit. to this end, i 
examine Heidegger’s critique of Hegel on the relationship between time and spirit; Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Phenomenology as exemplifying the Cartesian-fichtean metaphysics of the 
subject; and Heidegger’s later reflections on Hegel as articulating the modern metaphysics of 
‘subjectity’. i argue that Heidegger’s confrontation forgets those aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that 
make him our philosophical contemporary: Hegel’s thinking of intersubjectivity and recognition, 
of the historicity of the experience of spirit, and his critique of modernity. the point of this 
dialogue is to begin a retrieval of Hegel from Heidegger’s critical deconstruction, and thus to 
suggest that the future of Hegel—in Catherine Malabou’s phrase—remains something still to-
come.
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the genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold 
and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by 
attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not.  
Hegel, Science of  logic
after a certain period of neglect, philosophical interest in the Hegel-Heidegger re-
lationship has recently intensified in the english-speaking world.1 while some studies 
     1. recent works on the Hegel-Heidegger relationship include: rebecca Comay and John McCumber 
(eds.) endings. Questions of  memory in Hegel and Heidegger, evanston, northwestern University Press, 1999; 
Karin de Boer, Thinking in the light of  Time: Heidegger’s encounter with Hegel, albany, state University of new 
York Press, 2000; Michael allen gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of  History, Chicago, Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1984; david Kolb, The Critique of  Pure modernity. Hegel, Heidegger, and After, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1986; Catherine Malabou, The Future of  Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and dialectic, trans. 
lisabeth during, london, routledge, 2005; dennis J. schmidt, The ubiquity of  the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, 
and the entitlements of  Philosophy, Cambridge, the Mit Press, 1988. see also giorgio agamben, language 
and death: The Place of  Negativity, trans. K. e. Pinkus with M. Hardt, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991. 
roBert sinnerBrinK 133
adopt a distinctly Heideggerian perspective concerning Heidegger’s critique of Hegel,2 
others launch a Hegelian defence of Hegel against Heidegger’s interpretation, seeking 
to show that Heidegger has simply gone wrong in basic points of Hegel interpretation.3 
others again adopt a more agnostic view of the veracity of Heidegger’s reading of He-
gel.4 while all these approaches have merit, i wish to offer a more ‘dialogical’ approach 
to the Hegel-Heidegger relationship. indeed, both Hegel and Heidegger advocated such 
an approach to the practice of ‘originary’ philosophical thinking. in the Science of  logic, 
Hegel remarks on the immanent critique that moves beyond mere external refutation in 
order to confront the problem at issue from within an opposing philosophical standpoint 
(sl 581).5 Heidegger, for his part, observes that if a genuine dialogue with Hegel is to 
occur, ‘we are required to be “kindred”’ with him in the sense of being ‘committed to the 
first and last necessities of philosophical inquiry arising from the matter [Sache]’ (ga 
32 31).6 this paper shall therefore attempt to pursue the ‘thinking dialogue’ between 
Hegel and Heidegger, a dialogue centred on Heidegger’s ‘confrontation’ [Auseinanderset-
zung] with Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit.7 in particular, i consider Heidegger’s critique 
of Hegel on the relationship between time and spirit; Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Phenomenology of  Spirit as exemplifying the Cartesian-fichtean metaphysics of the sub-
ject, examining in particular the question of the phenomenological ‘we’ in Heidegger’s 
reading; and Heidegger’s later reflections on Hegel’s Phenomenology as articulating the 
modern metaphysics of ‘subjectity’ [Subjektität] that culminates in modern technics. i 
shall argue that Heidegger forgets those aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that make him 
our philosophical contemporary: Hegel’s thinking of intersubjectivity and recognition, 
his thinking of the historicity of the experience of spirit, and his attempt to sublate mod-
ern subject-metaphysics which is also a critique of modernity. the point of this dialogue 
is to begin a recovery or retrieval of Hegel from Heidegger’s critical deconstruction, 
and to thereby suggest that the future of Hegel—to use Catherine Malabou’s resonant 
phrase—remains for us something still to-come.
     2. see, for example Parvis emad, ‘the Place of Hegel in Heidegger’s Being and Time’, Research in Phenomenol-
ogy, no. 13, 1983, pp. 159-173; and david farrell Krell, ‘Hegel, Heidegger, nietzsche. an essay in descen-
sional reflection’, Nietzsche-Studien, no. 5, 1976, pp. 255-262.
     3. see, for example, denise souche-dagues, ‘the dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger’ in Christo-
pher Macann (ed.) martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Volume ii: History of  Philosophy, london, routledge, 
1992, pp. 246-276; robert B. Pippin, ‘on Being anti-Cartesian: Heidegger, Hegel, subjectivity, and social-
ity’ in r. B. Pippin, idealism as modernism: Hegelian Variations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; 
and robert r. williams, ‘Hegel and Heidegger’ in w. desmond (ed.) Hegel and his Critics, albany, state 
University of new York Press, 1989, pp. 135-157.
     4. one of the restrictions Karin de Boer imposes in her account of Heidegger’s encounter with Hegel is 
‘to minimize any consideration as to how far Heidegger’s interpretations of his predecessors’ are correct’. it 
is hard to see, though, how there can be a genuine ‘thinking dialogue’ if Heidegger’s readings of Hegel are 
accepted without critical reflection. de Boer, Thinking in the light of  Time, p. 5.
     5. as evident in my opening quotation from Hegel’s greater logic. g. w. f. Hegel, Science of  logic, trans. a. 
V. Miller, new Jersey, Humanities Press, 1969, p. 581, (henceforth sl).
     6. Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. Parvis emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, indiana 
University Press, 1988, p. 31, (henceforth HPs).
     7. Hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a. V. Miller, london, oxford, 1977, (henceforth Ps).
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i. Heidegger’s CritiCisM of Hegel on tiMe and sPirit
it is significant that Hegel is one of the few figures in Being and Time (along with 
descartes and Kant) singled out for an explicit critique.8 in this sense, we could regard 
Heidegger’s brief analysis of Hegel’s conception of the relation between time and spirit 
as a contribution to the task of a ‘de-struction’ [des-struktion] of the history of ontology.9 
temporality as such, according to Heidegger, has remained unthought or at least dis-
torted and misunderstood within the history of metaphysics, with the sole exception of 
Kant (Bt 20).  However, because Kant neglects to pose the fundamental question of 
Being, and lacks ‘a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject’, 
he was unable to gain proper access to the ontological significance of the problem of 
temporality (Bt 21). Heidegger traces Kant’s difficulties back to an appropriation of the 
Cartesian cogito without a ‘fundamental ontology’ of da-sein, and an assumed concep-
tion of time centred on the presence of the present. this ‘metaphysical’ understanding 
of time is based upon the assumption that the definitive dimension of temporal experi-
ence is provided by the familiar perception of the presence of beings encountered in the 
present. 
this presupposition becomes even more acute in the case of Hegel, who is taken to 
exemplify the ‘vulgar’ metaphysical conception of time as an infinite sequence of discrete 
‘nows’ or present moments. indeed, Hegel’s concept of time, according to Heidegger, 
is ‘the most radical way in which the vulgar understanding of time has been given form 
conceptually’ (Bt 392). Heidegger thus presents his brief critique of Hegel’s ‘metaphysi-
cal’ conception of time and spirit (in §82 of Being and Time) as a contrast to the existential-
ontological interpretation of the originary or ecstatic temporality of da-sein. Hegel’s ac-
count of the relationship between time and spirit—that spirit ‘falls into’ historical time 
and yet can be sublated or aufgehoben by speculative thought—is presented as evidence 
of how the metaphysical tradition has obliterated the question of temporality in favour 
of an ontologically inappropriate interpretation of da-sein as objective presence.
in accordance with aristotle’s demarcation of time within the ontology of nature, 
Hegel’s analysis of time is located in the second part of the encyclopaedia, namely the 
Philosophy of  Nature. Heidegger’s exposition of paragraphs 254-258 of Hegel’s encyclopaedia 
aims to establish how Hegel’s basic conception of time, defined as ‘intuited becoming,’ 
privileges the punctual moment of the present—as a now-Here moment—within the 
abstract becoming or flux of successive moments. Heidegger argues that the logical 
conceptualizing of time—as the negation of the negation of the punctuality of space—
demonstrates how time has been formalized  ‘in the most extreme sense’ and levelled 
     8. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan stambaugh, albany, state University of new York, 1996, 
§82, pp. 391-396, (henceforth Bt). 
     9. on this point Malabou eschews any confrontation between Heidegger and Hegel: ‘it is not my purpose 
here to stage a confrontation between the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions of time’. Malabou, The 
Future of  Hegel, p. 4. this prompts derrida, in his lengthy introduction to Malabou’s book, to ask a series of 
probing questions regarding the significance of this demurral. see Jacques derrida, ‘a time for farewells: 
Heidegger (read by) Hegel (read by) Malabou’, in Malabou, The Future of  Hegel, pp.  vii-xlvii, esp. pp. xxvii 
ff. 
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down to an ‘unprecedented degree’ (Bt 394).
a critical point can immediately be made here concerning Heidegger’s claims. He-
gel discusses space and time (in the Philosophy of  Nature) as the most minimal, elementary, 
and abstract determinations of nature in general (space presupposes nothing but nature’s 
self-externality while time presupposes nothing but space). space and time in this ab-
stract sense already acquire a more concrete significance with ‘place’ [ort]: the posited 
identity of space and time that is also their posited contradiction (ePn § 261).10 with the 
category of place, the abstract punctuality of the now as a present moment is already 
suspended in relation to the concrete determination of space.11 as Hegel remarks: ‘the 
Here is at the same time a now, for it is the point of duration. this unity of Here and 
now is Place’ (ePn § 260 a). the extreme formalization of time as a succession of now 
moments that Heidegger attributes to Hegel is already challenged at this still relatively 
simple level of categorical development in Hegel’s Philosophy of  Nature. although belong-
ing to a somewhat different context, the Phenomenology of  Spirit (Ps ¶¶ 90-110) similarly 
provides a critical demonstration of the untenability of the abstract punctuality of the 
now in the experience of sense-certainty. these points cast doubt on Heidegger’s presenta-
tion of Hegel’s conception of time as such.
nonetheless, Heidegger claims that Hegel’s determination of time as the negation 
of  negation is the most radical version of the aristotelian conception of time, but also 
the most levelled down conception of temporality in Heidegger’s originary, existential-
ecstatic sense. this logical formalization of time is precisely what allows Hegel to make the 
connection between spirit and its development through historical time: ‘Hegel shows 
the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit “in time” by going back to the iden-
tity of  the formal structure of  Spirit and time as the negation of  a negation’ (Bt 396). this is the 
decisive point in Heidegger’s discussion: the identity of time and spirit as sharing the 
logical structure of the ‘negation of the negation’ is also their reduction to an empty 
‘formal-ontological’ abstraction that obliterates originary temporality. this reduction 
makes possible their kinship as well as the ontologically obscure ‘actualization’ of spirit 
in time that Hegel describes. in connecting time and spirit in this manner, however, 
Hegel also leaves unexamined ‘the question of whether the constitution of spirit as the 
negating of negation is possible at all in any other way than on the basis of primordial 
temporality’ (Bt 396).
Heidegger insists that this brief discussion of Hegel cannot claim to decide whether 
‘Hegel’s interpretation of time and spirit and their connection is correct and has an 
ontologically primordial basis’ (Bt 396). nonetheless, i suggest that Heidegger’s crucial 
claim with regard to Hegel deserves further critical engagement. Here i draw attention 
to Heidegger’s compressed discussion of the essence of Hegelian spirit as the Concept or 
Begriff. Heidegger defines Hegelian Conceptuality as ‘the very form of thinking that 
     10. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of  Nature, Being Part Two of  the encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
trans. a. V. Miller, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970, § 261, (henceforth ePn).
     11. cf. ‘in this way, the negative determination in space, the exclusive point, no longer only implicitly [or in 
itself] conforms to the Concept [Begriff], but is posited and concrete within itself, though the total negativity 
which is time; the point, as thus concrete, is Place [ort]’, ePn § 260 [trans. mod].
CosMos and HistorY136
thinks itself: Conceiving itself—as grasping the non-i’ (Bt 395). this definition of the 
Concept is interpreted as the differentiation and comprehension of the difference be-
tween the ‘i’ and the ‘non-i’: ‘the grasping of this differentiation, a differentiation of the 
difference’ between i and non-i (Bt 395). the Concept thus has the formal structure 
of the ‘negation of a negation’. the ‘absolute negativity’ of the Concept, for Heidegger, 
gives ‘a logically formalized interpretation of descartes’ cogito me cogitare rem’ (Bt 395). in 
other words, the Concept comprehends itself in self-consciousness: it is the ‘conceivedness 
of the self conceiving itself ’, the self as it can authentically be, namely as free, a universal-
ity that is just as immediately ‘individuality’ (Bt 395).12
Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel’s Concept of self-consciousness is certainly le-
gitimate in its general outlines: the ‘i’ is the existing Concept, according to Hegel. at the 
same time, however, Heidegger overlooks that this way of understanding the relationship 
between the i and the Concept fails to take into account the (logical) limitations of the cat-
egory of existence, and moreover ignores the fact that self-consciousness is for Hegel the 
‘real-philosophical,’ finite actualization of the Concept. to make this point clearer, we 
must consider the relationship between the structure of the Concept and that of the ‘i’ 
as subjective spirit. in the Phenomenology, Hegel defines the Concept of self-consciousness 
as comprising three interrelated moments: the universality of the pure undifferentiated ‘i’; 
the particularity of the mediation through the sensuous object of desire; and the concrete 
individuality of the reflective movement of recognition between self-conscious subjects 
(Ps ¶ 176). while Heidegger accounts for the first moment (the abstract self-identity of 
the ‘i’ as i = i) and the second moment (the particularity of self-consciousness as desire), 
he has no account of the third moment (concrete individuality articulated through inter-
subjective recognition). indeed, Heidegger’s failure to account for the moment of concrete 
individuality in the Concept of self-consciousness clearly parallels the deficiencies in the 
Kantian-fichtean account of self-consciousness that Hegel seeks to overcome through 
his account of the role of mutual recognition.  in this sense, Heidegger, like Kant and 
fichte, remains stuck at the level of  reflection in conceiving of self-consciousness according 
to an abstract formalism: a deficient conception of self-consciousness which fails to unite 
all three moments of universality, particularity, and the crucial third moment of individu-
ality achieved through the process of recognition. 
Here we should also distinguish, furthermore, between the infinite structure of the 
Concept (the absolute, reflexive self-enclosure of the Concept as unitary or unique); 
and the ‘relative’ independence of the i, which is self-reflexive only through the recogni-
tion of the other, a process of ‘doubling’ or mutual reflection in which the other is both 
absorbed and released, both integrated and set free. the character of this process of 
recognition of and through the other, moreover, necessarily depends on the historically 
     12. in support of this ‘Cartesian-fichtean’ interpretation of the Concept, Heidegger cites Hegel’s statements 
that ‘the i is the pure Concept itself which, as concept, has come into existence [dasein]’ (sl 583), and that 
the i is ‘first, this pure self-related unity, … as making abstraction from all determinateness and content 
and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself ’ (sl 583). as i argue presently, these 
passages are significant in relation to Hegel’s parallel between the threefold structure of the Concept and 
the three aspects (universal, particular, and individual) of the Concept of self-consciousness (see Ps ¶ 176).
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given structures of objective and absolute spirit. for Hegel, the ‘i’ is unitary only by not 
being unique or solitary: it finds its self-identity in otherness only within a plurality that 
preserves the other. to this extent, the i genuinely does ‘fall into time’, according to 
Hegel, insofar as the character of its self-identity depends upon something which it, as 
finite spirit, can never fully absorb and sublate; it depends upon the historical actuality 
of objective and absolute spirit as an other of which it is merely an aspect, but in which 
it finds its self-identity and freedom in the sense of being with itself in otherness. only 
spirit in its evolving totality fully realizes the Concept; in its historical actualization it 
overcomes time within time itself.
Moreover, by emphasizing the parallel between the formal structure of self-con-
sciousness and the Concept, Heidegger’s ‘Cartesian’ interpretation of self-consciousness, 
as i shall argue further below, fails to comprehend the hermeneutic aspects of Hegel’s ac-
count of the relation between the ‘i’ as existing Concept and spirit as self-comprehend-
ing totality. Hegel’s characterization of the ‘i’ as existing Concept merely indicates its 
formal structure as a unity of universality, particularity, and individuality. it does not yet 
disclose those ‘real-philosophical’ conditions (namely the concrete historical forms of 
developing recognition) that make possible the determinate actualization of this formal 
structure (represented by the ‘i = i’). spirit is the concrete or actualized Concept that 
must appear in historical time, not simply because of the formal structure of the ‘negation 
of the negation’ shared by time and spirit, but because finite spirit remains dependent on 
objective and absolute spirit for its concrete self-identity in otherness. to be sure, spirit 
as totality is not reducible to subjective spirit as individual self-consciousness. none-
theless, spirit ‘exists’ concretely and historically only because there are self-conscious 
individuals who can acquire adequate self-consciousness within historically developing 
structures of mutual recognition, work off their natural particularity and inequality in a 
historical process which progressively discloses spirit in its concrete rationality, and thus 
(re)produce (objective and absolute) spirit as that which in turn makes possible the finite 
self-consciousness of these historically situated individuals. Hegel’s Phenomenology depicts 
this process as a recollection of the historical-dialectical experience in which spirit rec-
ognizes itself within ‘comprehended history’—a process of conceptual-historical recol-
lection without which, Hegel tells us, absolute spirit would remain ‘lifeless and alone’ 
(Ps ¶ 808).
although Heidegger’s brief critical analysis does not claim to do justice to Hegel’s 
broader philosophical project, Hegel is still presented as exemplifying the vulgar meta-
physical conception of time. Questions must be asked, however, about the adequacy 
of Heidegger’s interpretation. why does Heidegger focus on the concept of time taken 
from the philosophy of nature rather than Hegel’s explicit discussions of the historic-
ity of spirit? Moreover, why is Heidegger’s discussion in this respect restricted to the 
most abstract, elementary categorization of time in the philosophy of nature?13 Heidegger 
     13. in the section on the animal organism in the encyclopaedia Hegel seems to suggest that ‘time’ (and space) 
receives more concrete, higher determinations at higher levels of natural organization. the ‘subjectivity’ 
of the animal is a ‘free time’ that, according to inner contingency, ‘determines its place’. Hegel’s Philosophy of  
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ignores the hermeneutical dimension of Hegel’s procedure in appropriating and concep-
tualizing categories and models from the history of philosophy; he fails to recognize 
Hegel’s method of simultaneous exposition and critique in presenting categorical systems 
within speculative philosophy.14 it is not surprising that Heidegger finds Hegel to have 
recapitulated in the Jena lectures aristotle’s theses on time in the Physics, for Hegel 
hermeneutically appropriates these aristotelian themes within the philosophy of nature 
as one aspect of the speculative system. in the paragraphs Heidegger discusses from the 
‘Mechanism’ chapter of the encyclopaedia, for example, Hegel examines the categorical 
structure of time and space pertinent not only to aristotle but to Newtonian mechanics. 
the latter remains within the paradigm of the logic of essence that is the subject of He-
gel’s critical exposition in this part of the system (paralleled, for example, by the analysis of 
the dialectic between force and law in the Phenomenology). this discussion, however, can-
not provide an adequate example of the essential relationship between time and spirit, 
for the simple reason that nature occupies a different conceptual/categorical level than 
spirit, and thus cannot provide the basis for conceptualizing self-conscious spirit in its 
historical development. in §82 of Being and Time, Heidegger overlooks this hermeneutic 
dimension in Hegel’s discussion of time within the philosophy of nature and Hegel’s 
critical exposition of the ‘i’ as the finite actualization of the Concept.
ii. finitUde and infinitUde: Heidegger’s reading of Hegel’s 
PHeNomeNoloGy
as denise souche-dagues remarks, Heidegger’s ‘simple refusal’ of Hegel in Being and 
Time failed to do justice to the complexity and power of Hegel’s speculative thought.15 
Hegelian metaphysics cannot be reduced to a corpus of historically ossified material in 
need of critical de-struction and ontological re-animation, for Hegel claimed to have 
achieved the suspension of substance- and subject-metaphysics within the speculative 
metaphysics of spirit. Heidegger thus embarks upon a different strategy, a dialogical con-
frontation with Hegel that is part of the project of overcoming metaphysics in the sense 
of comprehending the underlying question of the metaphysical tradition (the question 
of Being) and of consequently responding to the forgetting of the ontological difference 
Nature, §351, p. 352.
     14. see Michael theunissen’s Sein und Schein. die Kritische Funktion der Hegelschen logik, frankfurt, suhrkamp, 
1980, for an interpretation of Hegel’s logic as involving this movement of simultaneous exposition and 
critique.
     15. as souche-dagues suggests in her helpful schema, we can identify three important phases in Heide-
gger’s reading of Hegel: 1) the critique of the ‘Hegelian theory of time’ in the 1925-26 Marburg lectures and 
in §82 of Being and Time. 2) the 1930/31 lectures on the ‘Consciousness’ chapters of the Phg and the 1942-
43 commentary on the introduction to the Phenomenology. 3) the 1957 lecture on ‘the onto-theological 
Constitution of Metaphysics,’ based on a seminar on the Science of  logic, and the accompanying 1957 text 
on ‘the Principle of identity’. these three moments can also be characterized as marking three distinct at-
titudes adopted by Heidegger towards Hegel: 1) a simple refusal of the Hegelian problematic, 2) an attempt 
to assimilate Hegel into Heidegger’s own project, and 3) a complicated ‘setting at a distance which wants 
to be an appropriation’. denise souche-dagues, ‘the dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger’. Quotation 
at pp. 246-247.
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between Being and beings. in this regard, Hegel is now understood as representing the 
beginning of the completion or consummation of western metaphysics (with nietzsche 
as the conclusion), a process that must be critically displaced in order to prepare for the 
possibility of an ‘other beginning’ of (no-longer-metaphysical) thought.
Heidegger’s next sustained engagement with Hegel occurs in the 1930/31 lecture 
series on the opening chapters of the Phenomenology of  Spirit, a reading that is centred on 
the problematic of finitude. Heidegger takes up this challenge concerning finitude and in-
finitude in reading the ‘Consciousness’ and ‘truth of self-Certainty’ chapters of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. it is also pursued and deepened in the later (1942/3) commentary on the 
‘introduction’ to the Phenomenology, the essay entitled ‘Hegel’s Concept of experience’ 
published in Holzwege in 1950.16 in his lectures on the Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly 
situates his critical dialogue with Hegel in the context of the post-Kantian metaphysics 
of the self-conscious subject. the confrontation between Hegel and Heidegger takes 
place on the terrain of the problematic of  finitude, the ‘crossing’ between Hegel’s concep-
tualization of the infinity of spirit and Heidegger’s thinking of the finitude of Being. as 
Heidegger remarks:
in our obligation to the first and last inherent necessities of philosophy, we shall 
try to encounter Hegel on the problematic of  finitude. this means, according to what we 
said earlier, that through a confrontation with Hegel’s problematic of infinitude we 
shall try to create, on the basis of our own inquiry into finitude, the kinship needed 
to reveal the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy (HPs 38).
Heidegger’s aim here is clear: to continue the task of a critical destruktion of the history 
of ontology through a confrontation between the Hegelian problematic of finitude and 
Heidegger’s own inquiry into finitude, and in so doing to provide the common problem-
atic for a ‘thinking dialogue’ with Hegel on the question of Being.
although Hegel ‘ousted finitude from philosophy’ by sublating it within the infini-
tude of reason, this was only an ‘incidental finitude’, Heidegger claims, a conception 
inscribed within the metaphysical tradition that Hegel was forced to take up and trans-
mit (HPs 38). as distinct from Kant, with Hegel infinitude becomes a more significant 
problem than finitude, since the interest of speculative reason is to suspend all opposi-
tions within the rational totality of thought-determinations. in this sense, Heidegger 
understands the project of post-Kantian idealism to consist in the systematic attempt 
to overcome the ‘relative’ knowledge of finite consciousness (in the sense of object-de-
pendent knowledge of otherness) in favour of the absolute knowledge of speculative reason 
(in the sense of a no longer ‘relative’ or object-dependent self-knowledge). as ab-solving 
or detaching itself from the relativity of consciousness, absolute knowledge detaches itself 
from relative cognition such that consciousness becomes aware of itself or becomes self-
consciousness. as i shall presently discuss, Heidegger’s interpretation of consciousness thus 
rests on the assumption that the entire phenomenological exposition adopts the stand-
point of absolute knowing in the sense of an absolvent knowledge that has absolved itself 
     16. Heidegger, ‘Hegel’s Concept of experience’ in off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Ken-
neth Maly, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 86-156, (henceforth HCe).
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from any dependency on the consciousness of objects (HPs 51). it is only with the unity of 
consciousness and self-consciousness in reason that knowledge becomes ‘purely unbounded, 
purely absolved, absolute knowledge’ (HPs 16). Phenomenology can thus be characterized 
as ‘the absolute self-presentation of  reason (ratio—logos), whose essence and actuality Hegel 
finds in absolute spirit’ (HPs 30).17
a) The Presupposition of  the Absolute and the Phenomenological ‘We’
a decisive aspect of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Phenomenology is the claim ‘that 
Hegel presupposes already at the beginning what he achieves at the end’—namely absolute knowl-
edge (HPs 30). absolute knowledge must be presupposed from the outset of the expo-
sition: ‘if we do not already from the beginning know in the mode of absolute knowl-
edge’, then we cannot truly understand the Phenomenology (HPs 33). Hegel, Heidegger 
continues, presupposes that the absolute is ‘with us, in and for itself, all along’ (Ps ¶ 73). 
indeed, Heidegger takes this statement to capture Hegel’s fundamental position.
this raises the question: who is the ‘we’ in Heidegger’s reading of Hegel? Heidegger’s 
interpretation presupposes that the Phenomenology begins absolutely with the absolute, 
and consequently that the phenomenological observer is already in possession of ab-
solute knowledge. indeed, Heidegger insists that we reject interpretations that take the 
Phenomenology to be ‘an introduction to philosophy’ leading from ‘the so-called natural 
consciousness … to a genuine speculative philosophical knowledge’ (HPs 29). Heide-
gger’s ontological interpretation emphasizes, rather, the unfolding of absolute knowledge 
as a fundamental-ontological presupposition. we must have already abandoned the 
‘natural attitude’ of everyday consciousness, ‘not just partially, but totally’, if we are 
properly to understand phenomenological experience (HPs 33).
this abrupt dismissal of any propaedeutic or ‘educative’ interpretation of the Phe-
nomenology as a Bildungsprozeß is maintained in the essay ‘Hegel’s Concept of experience’. 
Heidegger again rejects here traditional interpretations of the Phenomenology as an ‘ed-
ificatory’ introduction to philosophical science, a propaedeutic for ‘natural conscious-
ness’ to educate it to the level of philosophical or absolute knowledge: ‘in the opinion 
of philosophy even today, the phenomenology of spirit is an itinerarium, a description 
of a journey, which is escorted by everyday consciousness toward the scientific knowl-
edge of philosophy’ (HCe 107). such approaches, for Heidegger, fail to comprehend the 
ontological meaning of the Phenomenology as the self-presentation of the absolute in its 
presence (parousia) to us (HCe 109). for ‘[t]he presentation of phenomenal knowledge’, 
Heidegger tells us, ‘is not a route which natural consciousness can tread’ (HPs 108).18 
     17. for Heidegger, Hegel’s understanding of reason basically fulfils the traditional conception of the greek 
logos, via its transformation into the latin ratio, and later development as reason or Vernunft in conjunction 
with the traditional discipline of ‘logic’. this explains Hegel presentation of the conceptual and categorical 
structure of the absolute, which simultaneously integrates the basic metaphysical positions of the western 
tradition from greek ontology to transcendental idealism, in terms of a ‘science of logic’.
     18. on the other hand, Heidegger states a few pages later ‘that natural consciousness is alive in all shapes 
of spirit; it lives in each spiritual shape in its own way, including (and especially) that shape of absolute 
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it is worth mentioning the obvious difficulty that this interpretation is sharply at 
odds with numerous explicit statements in the text: Hegel describes the phenomenol-
ogy as a ‘ladder’ to the standpoint of science [Wissenschaft] (Ps ¶ 26), as an ‘education’ 
of the individual consciousness which repeats the formative path of universal spirit as 
though ‘in a silhouette’ (Ps ¶ 28), a ‘path of doubt’ or even ‘path of despair’ (Ps ¶ 78), and 
as the ‘detailed history of the education [Bildung] of consciousness itself to the standpoint 
of science’ (Ps ¶ 78). Heidegger’s interpretation seems prima facie to contradict Hegel’s 
repeated assertions in the Phenomenology.
Heidegger’s response is to point to the fundamental-ontological significance of the 
project of phenomenology. in Heidegger’s ontological interpretation, the phenomenologi-
cal ‘we’ has from the outset ‘lost the option of being this or that person and thus of being, 
randomly, an ego’ (HPs 48). rather, Heidegger’s reading implies that the phenomeno-
logical ‘we’ is to be understood as a ‘subjectivized’ version of Heidegger’s ‘fundamental 
ontologist’ already in possession of absolute knowledge; the ‘we’ refers to those who have 
already attained to absolute, fundamental-ontological knowledge of the whole.
Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological interpretation of the ‘we’ can be contrasted, i 
suggest, with a historicist-propaedeutic interpretation, which emphasizes the historical char-
acter of the process of educative cultivation to the level of science or Wissenschaft. the 
phenomenological ‘we,’ on this interpretation, refers to the culturally and historically 
situated ideal or imputed readers of the Phenomenology: philosophically cultivated indi-
viduals who desire, but do not yet possess, science, and are therefore to be educated 
to the level of speculative philosophy in order to transform their self-understanding 
[Besinnung] as historical subjects of modernity. the Phenomenology on this view is a philo-
sophical-historical propaedeutic to science that has an intrinsically dialogical structure: 
the cognitive claims of a given figure [Gestalt] of consciousness are presented by natural 
consciousness in its ‘own voice,’ while the structural inadequacies of each cognitive at-
titude, according to its own standard of truth, emerges for ‘us’ as phenomenological 
observers. ‘we’ can grasp the self-testing of consciousness and the immanent transi-
tions to progressively more complex and integrated figures of consciousness in a manner 
that ought to be intelligible to the superseded forms of natural consciousness as well, 
though usually is not due to the latter’s basic ‘unthinking inertia’ (Ps ¶ 80). indeed, for 
Hegel, natural consciousness is typically prone to existential inertia or thoughtlessness, 
sentimentality, lack of reflection, and historical amnesia concerning its own historical-
phenomenological experience (Ps ¶ 80). at the conclusion of the phenomenological 
drama, we realise that we have been observing the philosophico-historical conditions of 
our own experience as dissatisfied modern subjects. absolute knowledge, as the philo-
sophical self-comprehension of the history of spirit, is the result that is also the ground of 
our experience of self-alienated modernity.
why assume this historicist-propaedeutic reading of the phenomenological ‘we’? 
knowledge which occurs as absolute metaphysics and is at time visible to a few thinkers only’ (HCe 112). 
this remark does not seem reconcilable with Heidegger’s claim that natural consciousness is barred from 
the phenomenological path. 
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one reason is that it avoids the difficulty in Heidegger’s ontological interpretation that 
presupposing absolute knowledge seems to make redundant the project of a phenom-
enology before it even begins. in Heidegger’s interpretation, the Phenomenology quickly 
becomes an absolute ontology or all-consuming science of the absolute, rather than 
an introduction to the speculative system. if we presuppose that the ‘we’ is already in 
possession of absolute knowledge, we also presuppose knowledge of the categories and 
concepts underlying the figures of consciousness and self-conscious reason depicted in 
the Phenomenology. this means that Hegel’s claims concerning what the phenomenology 
is to perform (to be a ‘ladder’ to science, a path towards philosophical self-education, 
an introduction to the speculative system as a whole) become nonsensical. the presup-
position of an absolute standpoint not only renders phenomenology superfluous but 
makes it collapse before it even begins.
an historicist-propaedeutic interpretation answers this difficulty by pointing out 
that the immanent phenomenological exposition is precisely what educates ‘us’ both to 
recognize the experiences of consciousness as historical figures of spirit and to recognize 
ourselves within this experience. the phenomenological path of self-consummating 
scepticism is supposed to be a path that the so-called ‘natural consciousness’ of the 
(historically situated) reader can tread, precisely in order to learn that its self-alienation 
can be overcome in thought through the conceptual comprehension of its historico-phil-
osophical experience. the historically achieved level of conceptual-philosophical un-
derstanding—what Hegel called the ‘reflection philosophy of subjectivity’ culminating 
in Kantian idealism—provides the only ‘presupposition’ necessary for comprehending 
the transformation from ‘natural’ or rather philosophically naïve consciousness to the level 
of speculative thought. as Hegel states, the philosophically naïve reader ‘has the right 
to demand that science should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, 
show him this standpoint within himself ’ (Ps ¶ 26); a right based upon the individual’s 
‘absolute independence’, the right of  subjectivity that is one of the distinctive achievements 
of modernity.19 the naïve consciousness need not be excluded from phenomenology as 
a path that it cannot tread. rather, the modern subject can claim its right of subjectivity 
in being educated to the standpoint of science by climbing (and thereby suspending) 
Hegel’s phenomenological ladder. 
Heidegger’s response to this issue is to point to the inherently circular character of the 
Phenomenology that, like all philosophy, ‘merely unfolds its presupposition’ (HPs 36). in this 
case, it is the absolute knowledge of Being that allows the Being of self-conscious spirit 
to comprehend itself. Heidegger’s strongly ‘circular’ interpretation, however, faces the 
problem of accounting for Hegel’s rejection of the notion that philosophy develops out of a 
fundamental presupposition (as in Hegel’s criticisms of reinhold’s basic presuppositions 
of philosophizing). for Hegel, rather, the end emerges out of a process which is itself 
included in the result. Hegel’s fundamental hermeneutical principle is that ‘the whole is 
     19. ‘the intelligible form of science’, according to Hegel, ‘is the way open and equally accessible to 
everyone, and consciousness as it approaches science justly demands that it be able to attain to rational 
knowledge by way of the ordinary understanding’ (Ps ¶ 13).
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the true’—the truth emerges as a result of the whole process and the whole process in its 
self-unfolding is the site of the emergence of truth. the phenomenological exposition is 
therefore not the unfolding (and legitimation) of the foundational truth of an initial pre-
supposition (such as the absolute knowledge of Being), but rather the path of absolute or 
self-consummating skepsis. it is the unfolding of the untruth of whatever presuppositions 
consciousness makes about itself, the untruth of its own (limited and self-contradictory) 
standards of knowing and truth; this ‘untruth’ is thus itself a necessary ‘moment’ of truth 
as it is disclosed in the whole developmental movement. indeed, it is only the failure of 
the prejudices of natural consciousness that produces the possibility of science’s claim to 
be philosophical knowledge ‘without presuppositions’. 
the Phenomenology thus presents the demonstration of our ‘liberation from the oppo-
sition of consciousness’ (sl 49), and attainment of the speculative level of pure thought-
determinations that is the only ‘presupposition’ of the logic as such. it is in this sense 
that science begins with the matter itself [Sache selbst], without any external reflections.20 
Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology is therefore radically anti-foundationalist: Hegel rejects 
all (Cartesian or reinholdian) foundationalism in favour of a self-constructing process 
through which the disparity between knowing and truth is finally overcome. as Hegel 
remarks, the Phenomenology describes the coming-to-be of Wissenschaft, a becoming that is 
‘quite different from the ‘foundation’ of science; least of all will it be like the rapturous 
enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol, begins straight away with absolute knowl-
edge, and makes short work of other standpoints by declaring that it takes no notice of 
them’ (Ps ¶ 27). in asserting absolute knowledge as the absolute presupposition of the 
Phenomenology, Heidegger appears not to have heeded Hegel’s important claim that the 
absolute as a result is also the ground of the whole process of its own becoming.
b) Heidegger on Finitude
this brings us to the ‘crossroads’ of which Heidegger speaks in relation to Hegel: the 
problem of the infinite in Hegel’s and Heidegger’s understanding of finitude in relation to 
the meaning of Being. as Heidegger asks:
is the understanding of Being absolvent, and is the absolvent absolute? or is what 
Hegel represents as in the Phenomenology of  Spirit as absolvence merely transcendence 
in disguise, i.e., finitude? (HPs 65)
Heidegger is concerned to ask whether Being in its essence is finite and how this finitude 
is to be understood with reference to Being rather than in relation to beings. this is in con-
trast with what Heidegger takes to be Hegel’s conception of Being qua infinity, in which 
‘the infinity of absolute knowledge determines the truth of Being’, and does so such that 
‘it has already sublated everything that is finite into itself ’ (HPs 75). for Heidegger, 
Hegel’s sublation of finitude means that all philosophy moves in and as this sublation of 
     20. see stephen Houlgate’s discussion of the significance of Hegel’s project of a speculative logic that 
satisfies the (modern) historical demand for ‘free, self-grounding thought’. s. Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche, and the 
Criticism of  metaphysics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 41ff.
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finitude, which occurs in the process of a dialectical movement. Heidegger thus raises the 
question of the finitude of Being, a question that has hitherto not been raised but which 
has implicitly ‘motivated previous metaphysics’ (HPs 75). this is why the confrontation 
with Hegel over the problem of finitude and infinitude is ‘inherently and historically 
necessary’ as well as being a productive precondition for thinking through the question 
of Being.
let us turn to Heidegger’s account of the Hegelian concept of infinity. Heidegger 
indicates two aspects to this concept: 1) Hegel’s grounding of the problem of Being in 
the logos, manifested in Hegel’s ‘logical’ account of thinking as speculative knowledge 
or dialectic; and 2), the transposition of this logical grounding in descartes’ turn towards 
the ego cogito, manifested in ‘Hegel’s fundamental thesis’, as formulated by Heidegger: 
‘substance is in truth subject’21 (HPs 76-77). Heidegger thus describes the Hegelian 
concept of infinity as having both a ‘logical’ and ‘subjective’ grounding. the Phenomenol-
ogy undertakes the proper ‘subjective’ grounding of infinity in the subject and as subject, 
while the proper ‘logical’ grounding is developed in the Science of  logic (HPs 77). what 
is the relationship between the ‘logical’ and the ‘subjective’ grounding of infinity? on 
Heidegger’s reading, the concept of infinity is ‘inherently and necessarily grounded in 
the second [subjective] one’ (HPs 77). the logical meaning of infinity is grounded in the 
infinite character of self-consciousness, which is in fact the reverse of Hegel’s procedure, 
namely to point to self-consciousness or subjectivity as a ‘formal’ manifestation of the 
logical structure of infinity.
we can therefore raise certain questions here about Heidegger’s interpretation of 
infinity and self-consciousness, and his claim that the logical meaning of the infinite is 
grounded in the structure of self-consciousness (rather than the reverse). indeed, Hegel’s 
own account of the infinite character of self-consciousness emphasizes its inadequacy as 
an exemplification of the true infinite. for it is precisely because of its subjectivity that 
self-consciousness is not the full or complete manifestation of the infinite (understood as 
self-subsisting independence that incorporates the finite within itself). to be sure, self-
consciousness is the ‘existing Concept’, as previously discussed, but certainly not its full 
reality or concrete actualization, which is rather Spirit in its whole developed articula-
tion. in this case—namely the standpoint of self-consciousness as itself a Gestalt, or series 
of figures in the Phenomenology, sublated by reason—we have the finite (subject) as infi-
nite, but not the infinite (spirit) as finite, that is, articulated as a concrete individuality. 
the result is an opposition between an abstract self-identity of self-consciousness that 
attempts to dominate and integrate otherness, an otherness that is reproduced in this 
very process such that the opposition between self and other can never be overcome.
for clarification of this point we must turn to Hegel’s critique of the ‘bad’ or ‘spu-
rious’ infinity of Kantian self-consciousness (and its fichtean variant) in the Science of  
logic. Hegel is concerned here in particular with the practical effects of the opposition 
     21. we should note in passing that this formulation significantly alters, in a rather one-sided and rigid 
manner, Hegel’s own thesis in the Phenomenology: that the true is to be grasped ‘not only as substance, but 
equally as subject’ (Ps ¶ 17).
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between finite and infinite within the ‘spurious’ infinite belonging to the analytic under-
standing or Verstand. the latter—in the form of a ‘quantitative progress to infinity which 
continually surmounts the limit it is powerless to remove, and perpetually falls back into 
it’—is exalted in the philosophy of reflection as something ultimate and even divine (sl 
228). within the sphere of practical reason, the ‘progress to infinity’ is likewise exalted 
in the feeling of the sublime, in which the subject, to quote Kant in the Critique of  Practi-
cal Reason, ‘raises himself in thought above the place he occupies in the world of sense, 
reaching out to infinity’ (sl 229). this exaltation of the limitless progress indicates, for 
Hegel, rather the failure or succumbing of thought: the ‘bad’ infinite of the Kantian 
moral subject results in a ‘wearisome repetition’ in which a limit vanishes and reappears, 
is displaced into a beyond in order to be overcome, but in being overcome is once again 
displaced into another beyond, and so on ad infinitum. what results from such a endless 
progression is only the feeling of impotence in relation to this unattainable infinite as an 
ought-to-be, an alienation generated by the reflective understanding which attempts, but 
always fails, to master the finite (sl 229).
Hegel’s critique of the Kantian account of self-consciousness points to the delete-
rious moral-practical effects of the opposition between freedom and nature. within 
Kant’s account, the infinity of outer sensuous intuition is opposed to the infinite of self-
consciousness in its abstract universality. the self-conscious subject finds that its free-
dom lies in its (abstract) self-identity that is defined by excluding and opposing itself to 
‘the fullness of nature and geist’, which inevitably confronts it as a beyond (sl 231). the 
contradiction that emerges here is the same as that which structures the infinite progres-
sion: that between ‘a returnedness-into-self which is at the same time immediately an 
out-of-selfness’ (sl 231). the contradiction emerges between a self-identity defined by 
opposition to an other that is essential to the constitution of this self-identity, but which 
at the same time contradicts its essential character as a solitary self-relation or solus ipse. 
the result is a perpetual longing reminiscent of the self-alienation of the unhappy con-
sciousness and ‘beautiful soul’ of romanticism: the unsatisfiable desire to overcome the 
breach between the solitary and self-determining ‘void of the ego’, and the fullness of 
sensuous otherness, where the latter is negated by self-consciousness yet still present in 
the form of an unattainable beyond.
the practical implications of this deficient form of self-identity and universality are 
highly significant. Hegel argues that the antithesis between finite and infinite—or ‘the 
manifold world and the ego raised to its freedom’—results in a relation of domination in 
which the infinite fails to master the finite. self-consciousness, in determining itself in 
its abstract self-identity, proceeds to determine nature and attempts to liberate itself 
from it: the result is an objectification of  the finite (nature) and reification of  the infinite (the 
free subject) in which the power of the ego over the non-ego (sense and outer nature) 
is conceived such that morality can and ought to progress while the power of finite 
sensuousness is diminished (sl 231). the moral project of achieving a perfect adequacy 
of the free will in relation to the universal moral law is in fact an unending progress to 
infinity, an achievement that is ‘represented as an absolutely unattainable beyond’ (sl 231). 
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the struggle and meaning of morality is defined precisely through this unattainability 
of moral truth as an overcoming of the opposition between infinite freedom and finite 
sensuousness.
the conclusion i want to draw from this analysis is that it is impossible for the logi-
cal Concept of infinity in its true sense to be grounded in the infinity of self-conscious-
ness, as Heidegger maintains. indeed, Hegel’s critique of the subjectivism of the infinitude 
of self-consciousness argues explicitly against Heidegger’s thesis. for the infinitude of 
self-consciousness remains a ‘bad’ infinite mired within an insurmountable opposition 
to the finite that takes the form of an endless progress towards an unattainable beyond. 
Heidegger thus misattributes to Hegel the very conception of the spurious infinite that 
Hegel attempts to overcome.22
iii. Hegel’s ConCePt of exPerienCe
Heidegger’s 1942/43 interpretation of the introduction to the Phenomenology—the 
essay ‘Hegel’s Concept of experience’—is his most intensive treatment of Hegel’s phi-
losophy as a whole. Here i shall present a brief analysis with particular reference to the 
role of the ontological difference. for the critical question is whether Hegel actually 
does neglect the ontological difference in the exhibiting of the dialectical experience of 
consciousness, or indeed within the unfolding of dialectical-speculative logic. My aim 
here as previously is to question Heidegger’s reading of Hegel and to suggest that Hegel’s 
thought cannot be so readily sequestered as the culminating phase of modern subject-
metaphysics, as Heidegger and his twentieth-century followers will argue.
as Heidegger famously declared, modern philosophy is defined by the search for 
an absolute foundation for knowledge in ‘unconditional self-certainty’ (inaugurated by 
descartes and critically delimited by Kant). Hegel inherits and completes this search 
for an absolute or self-grounding knowledge that is grounded in the unconditional self-
certainty of self-consciousness. indeed, Hegel is the first philosopher, Heidegger notes, 
to fully possess the terrain of self-certain subjectivity once the Cartesian ‘fundamentum 
inconcussum’ is thought of as the absolute itself. with Hegel, the absolute, Heidegger 
explains, is spirit:
that which is present to itself [bei sich] in the certainty of unconditional self-knowing. 
real knowledge of beings as beings now becomes the absolute knowledge of the 
absolute in its absoluteness (HCe 97).
Heidegger’s formulations are certainly legitimate as far as Hegel’s claim to develop a 
system of absolute knowledge is concerned. from an ontological point of view, Heide-
gger develops in this connection his fundamental thesis concerning the meaning of the 
Phenomenology: that Hegel presupposes the presence or parousia of the absolute to us, and 
that the absolute wills to disclose its Being through (absolute) knowledge. Hegel’s aim 
     22. indeed, Heidegger avoids direct reference to the crucial distinction between the infinite of the 
understanding and the infinite of reason, relying instead on the exposition of the infinite provided in the 
Jena logic (HPs 77-78).
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from the beginning of the Phenomenology, Heidegger remarks, is ‘to indicate the absolute 
in its parousia among us’ (HCe 98). indeed, Heidegger takes Hegel’s remark—that ‘the 
absolute is from the start in and for itself with us and intends to be with us’—to be the 
fundamental statement of Hegel’s conception of Being (HCe 98). Hegel’s conception 
of Being is articulated in this ‘being-with-us (parousia)’ of the absolute, which is ‘in itself 
already the mode in which the light of truth, the absolute itself, beams [anstrahlt] upon 
us’ (HCe 98). the absolute is as the ontological horizon of Being in which beings are 
disclosed to us in their radiant and intelligible presence.
Heidegger then shifts emphasis in order to develop a thesis crucial for his later 
thinking: that in the course of modern philosophy, from descartes and Kant to Hegel 
and nietzsche, the meaning of Being is progressively subjectivized (culminating in the 
essence of modern technics or das Ge-stell). this thesis of a subjectivization of  Being is a 
central feature of Heidegger’s reading of the Phenomenology and of Hegel’s crucial role in 
the completion of western metaphysics. according to Heidegger, Hegel takes complete 
possession of the terrain of subjectivity by transforming it into self-knowing and self-
willing spirit. Philosophy becomes ‘science’ or Wissenschaft in the absolute metaphysics 
of Hegel precisely because ‘it takes its meaning from the essence of the subject’s self-
certainty which knows itself unconditionally’ (HCe 99). Philosophical science is thus the 
completion of the Cartesian project of a self-grounding knowledge that has its absolute 
foundation in the unconditional self-certainty of the knowing subject.
what does Heidegger mean here by the ‘subject’? since leibniz, Heidegger claims, 
entities have been understood to be whatever are intelligible as representable for a cog-
nitive subject. the subject, in speculative metaphysics,
is now that which truly (which now means ‘certainly’) lies before us, the subiectum, 
the hypokeimenon, which philosophy since antiquity has had to recognize as that 
which presences (HCe 99).
the subject has its Being in the representing relation to the object, and in being this 
representing relationship it also represents itself to itself as subject. the mode of Being 
of the modern metaphysical subject is self-certainty, in the sense of a self-conditioned, or 
rather, unconditional self-knowing. this mode of Being as unconditional self-knowing is 
what Heidegger calls the subjectity [Subjektität] of the subject:
the subjectity of the subject is constituted by the subject being a subject, i.e., by 
the subject being in a subject-object relation. subjectity consists in unconditional 
self-knowing (HCe 100).
the Being of the subject is subjectity in the form of self-grounding self-knowledge, which 
Hegel raises to the level of speculative science. this unconditional self-awareness, which 
for Heidegger is the goal of the Phenomenology, articulates the subjectity of the subject and 
provides the basis for conceptualizing ‘being qua being’ [das Seiende als Seiende] as a mode 
of self-grounding self-knowledge. interpreting the beingness of beings as subjectity means 
that Being is ‘subjectivized’; subjectity in Hegel is now tantamount to ‘the absoluteness 
of the absolute’ (HCe 100).
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a problem arises here that merits further consideration. How can the subject, whose 
Being is defined by subjectity, be considered absolute? as we saw earlier, the subjectity of 
the subject is defined in terms of the Being of the subject-object relation, which is there-
by raised to the level of unconditional self-knowledge. But the very notion of a subject 
as ‘absolute’ seems self-contradictory, since the subject, according to Heidegger, remains 
inscribed within the paradigm of the subject-object relationship, and thus marked by its 
‘relative’ status, that is, its insurmountable finitude. according to Heidegger, however, 
absolute knowledge is grounded in the Being of the subject-object relation qua subjectity, 
a move that reduces speculative knowledge to the level of merely ‘relative’ knowledge. 
it is not clear, then, how the figure of the subjectity of the subject—given its irreducible 
finitude and object/other dependence—can at the same time be raised to the level of 
the ‘absoluteness of the absolute’, as Heidegger maintains.
a final point to consider in Heidegger’s interpretation is the problem of the onto-
logical difference within the Phenomenology. according to Heidegger, this fundamental 
difference between Being and beings provides the un-thought origin and element of 
metaphysics in its entire history from Plato and aristotle to Hegel and nietzsche. this 
is to be understood as a history of decline [Verfallsgeschichte], namely as the forgetting of 
the ontological difference and indeed of the question of Being. Heidegger introduces 
the ontological difference into his interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology, aligning on-
tological knowledge with ‘Being’ and ontic or natural consciousness with knowledge of 
‘beings’. Hegel’s ‘natural consciousness’ is thus akin to ontic or pre-ontological conscious-
ness that pertains to beings as present to consciousness. ontological consciousness, on 
the other hand, describes the ab-solvent standpoint of the phenomenological ‘we’, those 
fundamental ontologists who heed the Being of beings in absolute knowledge.
indeed, Heidegger proceeds to assimilate Hegel’s ‘natural consciousness’ to fallen or 
inauthentic da-sein, which covers over any authentic ontological experience of origi-
nary temporality or indeed of Being as such (HCe 111-112). as Heidegger remarks: 
in its representation of beings, natural consciousness does not attend to being; 
nonetheless, it must do so. it cannot help but participate in the representation of 
the being of beings in general because without the light of being it cannot even be 
lost amidst beings (HCe 111-112).
Here the ontological difference is explicitly invoked in order to clarify Hegel’s distinc-
tion between the for-itself standpoint of consciousness and the for-us standpoint of the 
phenomenological observer. the very possibility of phenomenology is opened up by the 
ontological difference between beings apprehended by natural consciousness and Being 
as comprehended by the phenomenological ‘we’.
drawing on the analytic of da-sein in Being and Time, Heidegger interprets Hegel’s 
‘consciousness’ as ontic or preontological consciousness whose object comprises beings 
taken as representable. at the same time, consciousness is also ‘ontological consciousness’ 
in the sense of having an awareness of the beingness of beings as objectivity. the parallel 
Heidegger draws here refers to the ontic or preontological understanding belonging to 
da-sein in its everyday being-in-the-world; consciousness too has such a preontological 
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understanding even though consciousness only represents the ‘beingness of beings’ as 
objective presence. Heidegger thus attempts to absorb Hegelian phenomenology within 
the project of thinking the difference between Being and beings. Phenomenology is the 
process of making explicit this implicit difference between ontic and ontological truth, 
of comprehending the (unthematized) experience of the ontological difference between 
Being and beings.
Heidegger’s theses concerning the ontological meaning of self-consciousness and 
the subjectivization of the absolute are thus brought together in his interpretation of 
the dialectical movement of experience as naming ‘the Being of beings’. Hegel’s concept 
of ‘experience,’ according to Heidegger, names ‘phenomena, as phenomena, the on hei 
on,’ or beings thought in their beingness (HCe 135). ‘experience’, Heidegger argues, is 
thus now a word of Being designating the subjectity of  the subject. accordingly, the dialec-
tical experience of consciousness involves a comparison between ontic preontological 
knowledge and ontological knowledge. a dialogue or legein takes place between these two 
poles in which the claims of ontic and ontological consciousness are heard (HCe 138). 
this dialogical character of ontic-ontological consciousness prompts Hegel to call the 
movement of consciousness ‘dialectical’, where the latter is understood ontologically as 
the experience of consciousness defined as subjectity: ‘experience is the beingness of 
beings’, Heidegger states, ‘which is determined as subiectum on the basis of subjectity’ 
(HCe 138).
Heidegger’s ontological reading concludes with the ‘turning’ of natural conscious-
ness towards Being or the presence of the absolute: the inversion of consciousness is 
construed as returning us—the phenomenological ontologists ‘who are attentive, skepti-
cally, to the being of beings’ (HCe 153)—to our nature, which consists in our being in 
the parousia of the absolute. as phenomenological ontologists, we allow the ontic-onto-
logical dialogue of experience—the parousia of the absolute—to unfold according to its 
will to be with us or disclose itself in ontological knowledge.
at this point Heidegger articulates the explicit connection between the metaphysics 
of subjectity and the modern understanding of Being disclosed within the horizon of the 
essence of technology. as we have seen, Heidegger argues that the absolute discloses 
itself as subjectity. this modern understanding of Being as subjectity, which culminates 
with Hegelian absolute spirit and nietzschean will to power, determines modernity as 
the epoch of technics. Heidegger thus connects his critique of metaphysics with the 
confrontation with modernity: the critical encounter with technology as completed sub-
ject-metaphysics is announced through Hegel’s interpretation of Being as subjectity. as 
Heidegger states:
within subjectity, every being as such becomes an object. all beings are beings from 
out of and within steadfast reliability. in the age of subjectity [i.e., modernity], in 
which the essence of technology is grounded, if nature as being is put in opposition 
to consciousness, then this nature is only another name for beings as the objects of 
modern technological objectification which indiscriminately attacks the continued 
existence of things and men (HCe 144).
CosMos and HistorY150
what is striking in this analysis is its proximity to Hegel’s own critique of the subject-
metaphysics, or what Hegel elsewhere calls the ‘metaphysics of reflection’. Hegel too 
criticizes the practical effects of the principle of abstract identity and universality that 
results in the obliteration of particularity, the domination of otherness, and the reifi-
cation of subjectivity. Modernity, for Heidegger, is the era of subjectity and hence of 
technological objectification. Modern technology is itself nothing other than natural 
consciousness that ‘has at last made feasible the unlimited, self-assuring production of 
all beings through the inexorable objectification of each and every thing’ (HCe 112). 
But as we have seen, Hegel’s own critique of the subjectivization of the Concept, the 
‘bad’ infinity of the understanding, also emphasizes the domination, reification, and 
objectification resulting from modern subject-metaphysics. in this sense, Heidegger’s 
critical remarks provide a striking repetition of Hegel’s own critical confrontation with 
modern metaphysics of the subject and its moral-practical implications. in this respect, 
the dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger finds its shared matter of thinking in the 
critical confrontation with the metaphysics of modernity.
to conclude, in Heidegger’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, the need to overcome 
the self-alienation of the unhappy consciousness becomes the need to overcome the 
objectifying thinking of ontic consciousness in order to return to the parousia of the ab-
solute. in Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel, however, the negativity of the historical 
experience of spirit is lost in favour of a recovery of the forgotten ‘experience’ of the 
originary question of Being. instead of Hegel’s dynamic historical unfolding of inter-
subjective spirit we have Heidegger’s Verfallsgeschichte of a perennial forgetting of Being. 
Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegelian metaphysics thus remains determined by a 
philosophical metanarrative culminating not in freedom of subjectivity (as for Hegel) 
but in the nihilism of modern technics.
the main difficulty here, as i have argued, is Heidegger’s failure to grasp the inter-
subjective constitution of self-consciousness that provides the basis for Hegel’s dialectical 
interpretation of reason and spirit. for Hegel’s lasting legacy for the metaphysics of 
subjectivity is precisely his move from the abstract self-identity of formal models of 
self-consciousness (the Kantian and fichtean ‘i = i’) towards a conception of social and 
cultural intersubjectivity as a concrete self-identity-in-otherness achieved through mutual 
recognition. indeed, Hegel’s project is nothing less than an attempt to think the experi-
ence of modernity; to comprehend the history and conditions of the formation of mod-
ern subjects, and to do so in the most conceptually systematic manner possible.
Heidegger’s interpretation, however, neglects this intersubjective dimension of He-
gel’s Phenomenology. this is particularly evident in Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ interpretation 
of the phenomenological ‘we’, which equates it with the fundamental ontologist of Being 
and Time, and hence claims that the Phenomenology is grounded in a fundamental presup-
position—the absolute knowledge of Being. i have argued that this is an implausible 
interpretation of the project of the Phenomenology that fails to do justice to Hegel’s attempt 
to provide a ‘presuppositionless’ introduction to philosophical science.
 in these respects, we could say that the ‘thinking dialogue’ between Hegel and 
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Heidegger remains perhaps a philosophical monologue. Heidegger’s fine ear for the 
un-thought at the heart of metaphysics—so brilliantly attuned to Kant and profoundly 
engaged with nietzsche—seems somewhat deaf in the case of Hegel. for Heidegger 
fails to heed that the nihilism of metaphysics is not only the forgetting of Being but also 
the experience of freedom.23 nonetheless, the Hegelian and Heideggerian narratives 
of metaphysics—which mirror and invert one another—still provide a dual horizon 
for our own questioning of metaphysics and modernity; this is why the dialogue be-
tween Hegel and Heidegger remains philosophically important for us today. genuine 
dialogue, however, requires reciprocity, an engagement with the other; but perhaps we 
cannot demand this of a thinker exclusively devoted to the mystery of Being. Hegel once 
remarked, as though anticipating Heidegger,
the high sense for the eternal, the Holy, the infinite, strides along in the robes of a 
high priest, on a path that is from the first no path, but has immediate being at its 
centre, the genius of profound original insight and lofty flashes of inspiration. But 
just as profundity of this kind still does not reveal the source of essential being, so, 
too, these sky-rockets of inspiration and not yet the empyrean. true thoughts and 
scientific insight are only to be won through the labour of the Concept (Ps ¶ 70).
dr. robert sinnerbrink 
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